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Abstract
Empirical evidence shows that as of 2006, nearly every fifth large U.S. public corporation
was all-equity financed and that the corresponding average cash holding were nearly twice as
high as of the average U.S. firm. This paper therefore presents a simple real-options model to
characterize the value of cash for all-equity financed firms and analyze its impact on a firm’s
investment decision. The model shows that precautionary saving may lead to a delay in invest-
ment policy compared to the benchmark of full external financing. This is because saving is
an option to invest at a lower price in the future and this option has an additional time value,
thereby delaying optimal investment. In the context of growth options and external financing
frictions cash has extra value but this value is mostly negatively related to volatility. Testing
empirically whether all-equity firms destroy value by holding that much cash, I show that on
average the market values cash approximately at par. Moreover, cash is rather valued at a
premium if the presence of growth opportunities is being controlled for.
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1 Introduction
As of 2006, approximately 20% of all large U.S. publicly listed COMPUSTAT firms were all-equity
financed.1 Although facing no bankruptcy risk, average cash holdings of all-equity firms were equal
to a huge 46% of total assets. This is roughly twice as a high as for levered and unlevered firms
on average. Overall, the fraction of all-equity firms has varied between around 25% in the 1950s
and roughly 5% in the 1970s. Since then, the number of firms opting to have no leverage in their
capital structure has steadily increased. On the other hand, relative cash levels were flat at 25%
of total assets between the 1950s and 1970 before surging to levels as high as nearly 50% of total
assets. Both trends are visualized in Figure [1].
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Figure 1: Evolution of All-Equity Firms and Corresponding Cash Holdings
Investigating why firms choose no to include debt in their capital structure, Strebulaev and Yang
(2006) find that the choice can neither be explained by firm size nor industry. While it is true
on average that all-equity firms are smaller than their levered counterparts, it turns out that in
13% of the cases, all-equity financed dividend paying firms are larger than the 75th percentile of
their industry. Similarly, Strebulaev and Yang (2006) also show that while traditional high growth
industries such as technology and healthcare have a larger fraction of all-equity firms, the median
1The definition of large U.S. publicly listed firms follows Strebulaev and Yang (2006).
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industry still has 7.5% of zero levered firms.
The objective of this paper is to investigate both theoretically and empirically whether, condi-
tional on being all-equity financed, all-equity firms destroy value by saving cash. Using a simple
real-options model, I first derive the value of cash in case a firm can increase production capacity.
If the firm does not have internal funds, it needs to access external capital markets to finance the
expansion which comes at a cost due to informational asymmetries between the firm and outside
investors. On the other hand, saving also reduces firm value as management might waste resources
which in turn induces costly monitoring activities by shareholders. The firm therefore has to trade
off costs of external finance against agency costs of free cash flow to optimally exercise its option
and maximize firm value.
The model quantifies the value of internal funds and shows that even in absence of bankruptcy
a firm might value one dollar of additional funds at more than its notional amount. Furthermore,
I show that volatility has an ambiguous and mostly negative effect on the value of internal funds.
This is because cash derives its value by possibly avoiding costs of external finance when exercising
the option. However, in the majority of cases costs of external finance lose their relative importance
when volatility is increased. Focusing on the relation between cash holdings and investment policy,
the paper also shows that precautionary saving might lead to a delay in investment policy compared
to the case in which the project was completely externally financed. Thus, because saving is an
option to pay lower financing costs in the future, a value maximizing firm will wait longer to invest
than if it did not save at all.
The model solves for optimal saving policy and also describes the marginal value of internal funds
depending on different allocations of cash and cash flow. The marginal value of cash is influenced
by costs of external finance, agency costs of free cash flow, the level of the firm’s cash account
and current cash flow. Firms value cash most when financing costs are high, agency costs small
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and the probability of exercising the option is (relatively) high. Alternatively, regressions based on
simulated data also reveal that cash is valued at a premium in the context of growth options and
that the premium is higher if firms just started to retain funds.
The empirical section combines the estimation equation implied from the theoretic model with
an approach by Fama and French (1998) which has been used to analyze the impact of taxes and
financing decisions on firm value. By doing so, I propose an extension to the existing literature
centering around Pinkowitz et al. (2006) and show that on average, all-equity firms do not destroy
value by holding that much cash. Moreover, the presence of growth opportunities further increases
the value of cash.
This paper mainly relates to both theoretical and empirical literature dealing with the value of
cash or financial flexibility. In a related paper, Gamba and Triantis (2008) determine optimal capital
structure of a firm which can invest in profitable growth opportunities. They use a neoclassical
model in which the firm is partly financed with equity and debt and can decide whether it retains
earnings, pays a dividend or pays down debt. Saving cash serves two functions. First, it allows
the firm to avoid defaulting in low profitability states as the cash on hand decreases its net debt
exposure. Second, by making external financing costly it allows the firm to prevent additional
financing costs when growth opportunities are exercised in high profitability states. They find that
the value of financial flexibility can be quite large in the presence of profitable growth opportunities
or when the firm is exposed to negative income shocks. Also, Asvanunt et al. (2007) look at
optimal investment policy when external financing is costly. Focusing on a levered firm they show
how optimal investment policies differ depending on whether firm or equity value is maximized.
Allowing the firm to save cash, they show that riskier firms have higher optimal cash balances,
thereby confirming recent empirical work by Acharya et al. (2009) who show that empirically there
is a positive relation between cash holdings and credit spreads.
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The theoretic part in this paper differs from Gamba and Triantis (2008) and Asvanunt et al.
(2007) on several fronts. First, this work focuses on whether cash has any significant economic
value in case it does not serve as a liquidity buffer reducing bankruptcy risk. Doing so, I am able to
provide new insights regarding the valuation of cash and the impact of cash holdings on corporate
investment policy. Specifically, it is shown that the value of cash is mostly negatively related to
volatility. The intuition is that cash only has value in good states of nature, i.e. when the firm is
doing well. Saving essentially reduces the future strike price of the capacity expansion option such
that, compared to the case of full external financing, the growth option is more in the money. As
it turns out, for most parameter values an increase in volatility is less valuable in case the firm
saves or, put differently, when the option is more in the money. Given that a substantial number
of firms is all-equity financed and has huge cash holdings, this result is also of practical relevance.
On the other hand, the paper also shows that optimal saving policy leads to a delay in the firm’s
investment policy. Again, because saving provides the firm with an option to exercise the project at
a lower strike price in the future, a value maximizing firm is willing to invest later even if it faces the
same current cost of external financing. Second, contrary to both papers I assume quadratic agency
costs of free cash flow to account for the fact that managers want to engage in empire building in
the case of high retention which in turn induces costly monitoring activities by shareholders. The
assumption of convex agency costs considers the fact that monitoring gets increasingly expensive
the more funds are retained within the firm. Besides, it also implies an interior solution for optimal
corporate saving policy for which I derive a concrete expression. Third, I am able to derive a
closed-form solution for a simplified version of the model which is useful for better understanding
the negative relation between the value of cash with respect to volatility. Finally, this work also
includes an empirical section which tests the main implications of the model.
Other related work includes Boyle and Guthrie (2003) who analyze a firm’s dynamic investment
decision when the firm is allowed to save cash to relax an exogenously given financing constraint
resulting from asymmetric information. They show that due to the possibility of future earnings
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shocks, a firm may be willing to exercise its growth option prior to the benchmark case established
by an otherwise unconstrained firm. This setup is different from my model, where the firm starts
as a constrained firm and can reduce its dependence on external capital markets by engaging
in precautionary saving.2 Finally, using a representative agent framework, Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2009) study level and dynamics of the value of aggregate liquidity when external shocks occur.
They find that aggregate value is highest when investment opportunities are abundant but levels
of current cash flow are low.
Early empirical literature on the value of cash includes Opler et al. (1999) who analyze a static
trade-off model of optimal corporate cash holdings. They find that small firms with growth oppor-
tunities tend to hold more cash than the average firm. Focusing on the cash-flow sensitivity of cash,
Almeida et al. (2004) show that firms save operating cash flow if they are financially constrained.
This is tested by regressing the change of cash holdings on operating cash flow, market-to-book
ratio and size. Han and Qiu (2007) extend the model of Almeida et al. (2004) by not allowing
the firm to hedge future cash flow risk. They are able to show that an increase in volatility of
cash flow leads to higher contemporary saving decisions. However, Riddick and Whited (2009)
question the results found in Almeida et al. (2004) and argue that the correlation is mainly due
to measurement error in the market-to-book ratio which acts as a proxy for marginal q.3 Erickson
and Whited (2000) and Riddick and Whited (2009) show that when using higher-order moments,
they are able to increase estimator precision and mitigate the measurement error problem. Doing
so, it turns out that the coefficient on operating cash flow turns negative, indicating that there is
a negative relationship between operating performance and saving. This can be explained by the
2Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010) extend their work and introduce financing costs into the original model. How-
ever, similar to the underlying paper by Boyle and Guthrie the focus is not on the value of cash. Another difference
concerns the general setup of the model which will be discussed in section [2].
3Modern q theory as introduced by Lucas and Prescott (1971) argues that marginal adjustment costs of investing
have to be equal to the shadow value of capital, termed as marginal q. This shadow value measures the firm’s
expectation of the marginal gain from investing. Measurement error stems from the fact that empirical tests have
to rely on average q, or market-to-book ratio, as an input in the regression models. However, average q relates the
valuation of the firm’s existing capital to its replacement costs and is equal to marginal q only under very restrictive
assumptions. Further details on the q theory of investment can be found in Hayashi (1982) and Hennessy (2004).
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fact that if firms receive positive (negative) shocks to their cash flow, they tend to invest more
(less) thereby reducing (adding) funds from (to) their cash account. Finally, Bates et al. (2009)
document a huge increase in average cash holdings, specifically for non-dividend paying and riskier
firms. Using variants of the regression setup proposed by Opler et al. (1999) they find that this is
mostly due to changing firm characteristics.
Focusing on the market value of cash, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) and Pinkowitz et al.
(2006) rely on an estimation approach initially proposed by Fama and French (1998). They regress
firm value on different accounting variables including the level or changes in the cash account to
infer the marginal contribution of the individual regressors. This approach has also been employed
by Drobetz et al. (2009) who estimate the value of cash in the context of informational asymmetries.
An alternative but similar way has been suggested by Faulkender and Wang (2006) who regress
excess stock return on cash and different control variables to get an estimate of the marginal value
of cash. This paper contributes to the empirical literature by suggesting a simple, yet important
extension to the approach proposed by Pinkowitz et al. (2006). Doing so, I am able to show that
on average all-equity firms do not destroy value by holding that much cash.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I first introduce the model and the corresponding
valuation equations. Besides, I derive a closed-form solution for a simplified version of the model
and perform comparative statics. Section 3 analyzes the impact of saving on a firm’s investment
decision and computes the value of internal funds. I also run regressions based on simulated data
to obtain an alternative estimate of the value of cash. Section 4 empirically estimates the value of
cash. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model
As Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1961) have shown, in a frictionless world financing, payout and
investment policy are independent of each other. To make internal financing matter, I therefore
introduce two frictions, namely costs of external finance and agency costs of free cash flow.
The value of internal funds is derived within a simple real-options framework by calculating the
value to internally finance an investment. Similar to Dixit and Pindyck (1991) and McDonald and
Siegel (1986), I model a firm which has the option to increase production capacity. Departing from
traditional real-option models, I focus on the question of how the expansion is financed. If at the
time of the capacity expansion the firm has sufficient cash available, it will be able to internally
finance the investment at its true investment costs. However, if it turns out that liquid funds are
insufficient - which might be the case if the company has paid out part of its cash as dividends to its
shareholders - the firm additionally incurs costs of external finance for raising the missing amount.
Thus, retaining cash within the firm allows the firm to exercise its expansion option at a lower
strike price. However, there exists a trade-off as holding cash is also costly due to the existence of
agency conflicts between management and shareholders.
To explore whether there is a value of internal funds, I proceed as follows. I first derive firm and
option value for a firm following an optimal retention policy. To quantify the gain from saving, this
value is then compared to the case when the firm has not engaged in precautionary saving.
2.1 Basic Setup
Consider a firm which produces a single product and operates at some initial capacity level K0.
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The cash flow produced by the firm is risky and follows a Geometric Brownian Motion
dx = µxdt+ σxdWQ (1)
4For simplicity, the initial capacity level is normalized to 1.
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where dWQ is a standard Brownian motion under the risk neutral measure Q and µ and σ
are mean and volatility of the growth rate of x. I further assume that there exists a traded
asset being perfectly correlated with the firm’s cash flow which has the following dynamics dX =
rXdt+ σXdWQ where r > µ and δ ≡ r − µ.
The firm is all-equity financed such that all earnings accrue to shareholders either via dividend
payments or via capital gains. If the firm retains its earnings, it can put the money on the cash
account where it earns a riskless return r. However, following Jensen (1986) saving cash is costly
as management might be more likely to engage in value-destroying ”empire building” when cash
reserves are abundant. Shareholders therefore would want to monitor the firm, which comes at a
cost. I follow Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) in assuming that only the fraction of the operating cash
flow which is retained within the firm is subject to quadratic agency costs. The main intiution
underlying this argument is that liquid funds can then be allocated to a financial intermediary such
that each period only the retained fraction of earnings has to be monitored. Letting C denote the
cash account, α the retained fraction of cash flow and combining above, we get that
dC =
{
αx− φ
2
(αx)2 + rC
}
dt (2)
where φ is a parameter capturing the severance of agency costs of free cash flow.5 To ensure
that firm value is maximized, I allow the firm to choose an optimal retention policy by treating α
as a stochastic optimal control variable.6
The explicit treatment of agency costs of free cash flow marks a sharp distinction to the models
of Asvanunt et al. (2007) and Gamba and Triantis (2008) as saving becomes increasingly expensive
the higher the fraction of retained earnings. Specifically, Gamba and Triantis assume that there
5Note that taxation is not included in this model. While there is a tax disadvantage of keeping cash within the
firm, it is also true that at investor level, dividends are usually taxed at a higher rate than capital gains. A meaningful
calculation would therefore require to specify the tax burden at the investor level. To abstract from these practical
complexities, this paper focuses on agency costs of free cash flow as the opposing friction.
6For more details see Proposition [1].
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is a tax disadvantage of keeping the cash within the firm resulting in a linear treatment of agency
costs. Asvanunt et al. assume that the return on the cash account is lower than the risk-free rate
r, i.e. rx < r. On the other hand, quadratic agency costs capture the intuition that if the firm is to
receive a positive cash flow shock, management is more likely to deduct part of the cash flow and
use it for empire building activities. To prevent management from doing so, shareholders thus have
to incur higher monitoring costs. Besides, the assumption also enables me to derive an analytical
expression for optimal corporate saving and dividend policy.
It is important to notice that the setup is also different from Boyle and Guthrie (2003) who
assume distinct dynamics for operating profits and cash account. This is due to the fact that they
investigate the possibility of future financing shortfalls and its implications for optimal exercise
policy compared to an otherwise unconstrained firm.7 In this model, the focus is on another
aspect. Starting with a firm which has to finance the whole project externally, I analyze how much
value the firm would add by not paying out dividends and instead optimally saving part of the cash
flow to reduce future financing needs.
The firm has the option to increase capacity to a higher level K1 by paying the necessary invest-
ment costs IC. However, if it lacks internal funds it has to raise all or part of the missing amount
externally. External financing comes at a cost. Specifically, I consider the following general cost
function e(Ct) which equals
e(Ct) =

γ0 + γ1 (IC − Ct) + γ2 (IC − Ct)2 when Ct < IC,
0 else
(3)
The specification of this function has been taken and adapted from Hennessy and Whited (2007)
7Boyle and Guthrie assume that prior to exercising the growth option the firm consists of assets in place G and
the cash account X. Assets in place generate an income stream equal to νGdt+φGdZ which directly affects the cash
account whose dynamics are given by dX = rXdt+ νGdt+ φGdZ.
10
who structurally estimate external financing costs.8 Total costs of capacity expansion are therefore
given by the sum of investment costs and costs of external finance.
Total firm value depends on both state variables xt and Ct and is finally given by the sum of
expected dividend payments and expected capital gains which include the cash retained within the
firm and the capital gain due to potential capacity expansion.
Proposition 1 Total firm value, denoted by V (x,C) is a function of both state variables x and
C and has to satisfy the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation under the risk-neutral
measure Q
rV = max
α
{
(1− α)x+ (r − δ)xVx + (αx− φ
2
(αx)2 + rC)VC + 1/2σ
2x2Vxx
}
(4)
where the first order condition implies that
α∗ =
VC − 1
φxVC
(5)
with the additional requirement that α∗ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: See Appendix.
One can see that optimal corporate saving policy depends on different factors. When agency
costs of cash flow are zero, i.e. φ = 0, there will be a bang bang type of solution. As long as the
marginal value of cash exceeds one, the firm would want to retain all earnings. When there is no
value premium of cash, it would instead pay out all proceeds as a dividend. The introduction of
quadratic agency costs of free cash flow implies that there will be some allocation of x and C such
that it will be optimal to save a fraction of current earnings. Along with general intuition, there
is a positive relation between the severity of agency costs of free cash flow and implied dividend
8External financing costs thus capture in a reduced form both costs stemming from informational asymmetries as
well as transaction costs.
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payout ratio.
In order to determine total firm value one has to solve the HJB-equation with respect to the
following boundary conditions.
V (0, Ct) = Ct
V (x∗, Cτ ) = K1x
∗
δ + Cτ − IC − e(Cτ )
Vx(x
∗, Cτ ) = K1δ
(6)
where x∗ is the investment threshold of the capacity expansion option and Cτ denotes the
amount of cash available at the time the option is exercised. The first condition states that if
the value of the cash flow hits zero, the firm is liquidated and is only worth the value of the
cash account, Ct. The second condition implies that at the time of exercising the option the
firm receives the payoff of the capacity expansion, pays corresponding investment and financing
costs and retains a corporate cash account equal to Cτ . The last condition is the traditional
smooth-pasting condition ensuring optimal exercise policy. The value-matching condition reflects
the fact that after exercising the option all future earnings are paid out as dividends such that
V (xτ , Cτ ) = E
Q
τ
[∫∞
τ e
−r(t−τ)K1xtdt
]
+ Cτ .
2.2 The Value of Internal Funds
The value of internal funds is derived by comparing total firm value under optimal saving policy to
the case when all earnings are paid out as dividends. As such it quantifies the maximum increase in
firm value by optimally trading off costs of external finance against agency costs of free cash flow.
Definition 1 The value of internal funds is defined as the change in total firm value due the fact
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that the firm follows an optimal saving policy. Specifically, it is given by
R(x,C) ≡ V (x,C)− V B(x,C) (7)
where C is the shortcut for C(x, α) and V B(x,C) denotes firm value under the benchmark case
of complete external financing.
For the benchmark case, denoted by V B(x,C), I assume that all earnings are paid out as a
dividend. It is derived as follows.
Proposition 2 The benchmark case is assumed to be an all-equity firm which pays out all earnings
as a dividend to its shareholders and which finances the project completely externally. Total firm
value, denoted as V B(x,C) satisfies the following PDE
rV B = x+ (r − δ)xV Bx + rCV BC + 1/2σ2x2V Bxx (8)
and is given by
V B(x,C) = C +
K0x
δ
+Bxβ1 (9)
where B =
(
(K1−K0)x∗2
δ − IC − e(0)
)(
1
x∗2
)β1
with the corresponding optimal trigger level x∗2.
Proof: See Appendix.
While the benchmark case has a closed-form solution, it turns out that equation [4] can not be
solved analytically if subject to the boundary conditions given in equation [6]. I therefore choose to
solve V (x,C) numerically by resorting to finite difference methods, i.e. Crank Nicholson Scheme.
The PDE is solved on a grid with nodes (xj , Ci) : j = 1, ...,M, i = 1, ..., N where xj = jdx and
dC = Ci − Ci−1. Partial derivatives are approximated by
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Vx =
1
2
(
Vi−1,j+1−Vi−1,j−1
2dx +
Vi,j+1−Vi,j−1
2dx
)
Vxx =
1
2
(
Vi−1,j+1−2Vi−1,j+Vi−1,j−1
(dx)2
+
Vi,j+1−2Vi,j+Vi,j−1
(dx)2
)
VC =
Vi,j−Vi−1,j
dC
(10)
which implies that the resulting difference equation at node (xj , Ci) can be formulated as
−ajVi−1,j−1 − (bj − di,j)Vi−1,j − cjVi−1,j+1 = ajVi,j−1 + (bj + di,j)Vi,j + cjVi,j+1 + ej (11)
where
aj =
σ2j2−µj
4
di,j =
αjdx−φ/2(αjdx)2+ridc
dc
bj = −σ2j2+r2
cj =
σ2j2+µj
4
ej = (1− α)jdx
(12)
Further details regarding the numerical solution can be found in the Appendix.
The value of internal funds introduced by Definition [1] gives an absolute answer to the value
of cash but it can not be used to judge whether the amount gained or lost due to not paying out
dividends is economically significant. I therefore compare the value of internal funds to the initial
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value of the capacity expansion option for the benchmark firm.
Definition 2 The relative gain from saving is defined by comparing the value of internal funds to
the value of the capacity expansion option of the benchmark case. Specifically, it is defined as
S(x,C) ≡ V (x,C)− V
B(x,C)
Bxβ1
(13)
By construction S(x,C) captures the gain from saving by comparing the value of internal funds
to the value of the initial growth option and it quantifies by how much the firm can relatively
increase the value of its growth option if it follows an optimal saving policy. Before I proceed to
the numerical implementation, I present a simplified version of the model which allows for a closed
form solution.
2.3 Implications from a Simplified Model
This section introduces a simplified model to determine the maximum attainable value of internal
funds. This is a hypothetical value as it does not consider the attainability of the solution and
agency costs of free cash flow. Nevertheless, it is very useful as its closed-form solution allows me to
perform comparative statics which then can be compared against the dynamics of the true value.
I therefore consider the following fictitious example. Consider the case of a firm which has an
initial cash balance C0 greater than the necessary investment costs. Let’s further assume that the
firm is not subject to agency costs of free cash flow. The investment environment described in the
previous section is still valid and the firm therefore plans to increase its capacity level. However,
the firm needs to decide whether it wants to pay out all its cash holdings and future earnings
as dividends or not. By doing so it would have to finance the project completely externally and
investment costs would increase to IC + e(0). The firm therefore calculates the value of internal
funds and assesses the relative gain from saving.
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Proposition 3 The hypothetical value of internal funds, Rh(x), is only a function of x and is
given by
Rh(x,C) = Rh(x) = xβ1 (A−B) (14)
where A =
(
(K1−K0)x∗1
δ − IC
)(
1
x∗1
)β1
with the corresponding optimal trigger level x∗1.
Proof: See Appendix.
Depending on individual firm characteristics, such as assumed factor of capacity expansion,
costs of external finance, drift rate, volatility and risk-free rate, Rh(x) will take on different values.
The advantage of calculating this hypothetical value is that the closed form solution helps to
quickly assess whether saving is potentially valuable and it allows for a better understanding of
how individual parameters affect the value of internal funds.
Doing so, it can be shown that the magnitude of the increase in production capacity, does not
affect the relative gain from saving. This fact is useful also in that it will make the numerical results
presented in the following section more robust as the relative gain from saving is unrelated to the
increase in capacity level.
Proposition 4 The relative gain from saving is unrelated to the magnitude of increase in capacity.
That is,
∂Sh(x)
∂∆K
= 0 (15)
where ∆K = K1 −K0.
Proof: See Appendix.
A final interesting feature to notice is that the hypothetical value of internal funds is ambiguously
related to volatility. This is because cash derives its value by possibly avoiding costs of external
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finance when exercising the option. However, for most cases costs of external finance lose their
relative importance when volatility is increased which induces a negative relation between value of
internal funds and volatility.
Proposition 5 The effect of volatility on the hypothetical value of internal funds is ambiguous.
Specifically, it depends on the costs of external finance and on the level of volatility. The expression
for the partial derivative of the value of internal funds with respect to volatility is given by
∂Rh(x)
∂σ
= Axβ1
∂β1
∂σ
{
log
( x
x∗
)
− (1 + γ)1−β1 log
(
x
x∗(1 + γ)
)}
(16)
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows. It is well known that an increase in volatility leads to
an increase in the value of a call option on the firm’s assets, thus the capacity expansion option
is positively related to an increase in uncertainty. This holds true for both the option value under
complete external and internal financing. However, for most parameter values the increase is more
pronounced in case the project is financed completely externally, thereby implying the (mostly)
negative relation between volatility and the value of internal funds. In other words, cash reduces
the future strike price and therefore implies that the option is more in the money. However, loosely
speaking, this also enlarges the area of downside risk which is why an increase in volatility is not
necessarily value enhancing. In that sense, the result can be seen as the opposite of the asset
substitution problem.
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3 Numerical Analysis
The objective of this section is to assess both the value of cash and how cash holdings and invest-
ments are interrelated. The analysis starts by investigating how saving and cash holdings affect
corporate investment decisions. I then analyze the dynamics of optimal saving and payout policy,
compute the value of internal funds and analyze its relation with respect to volatility. As a next
step, I run regressions based on simulated data to obtain an alternative estimate of the value of
cash. The section concludes with a variety of robustness checks.
Similar to many other financing and investment models, the problem studied in this paper does
not have a closed form solution. I therefore solve the model using numerical techniques and illustrate
results using a simple example. For this purpose, the risk-free rate is set to 6%, the drift rate µ to
1%, cash flow volatility to 19% and the agency cost parameter φ is set equal to 0.05. These values
are similar to both existing papers and empirical observations.9 Assuming a starting value of the
cash flow process of 1, i.e. x0 = 1, it follows that the initial fundamental value of the firm equals
20. In order to make the growth option economically relevant, I set the costs of the expansion
option equal to 10 and assume that production can be increased by 50 percent, i.e. ∆K = 0..
Finally, the cost of external finance is taken from Hennessy and Whited (2007) and is set to their
estimate for small firms to capture the effect of external financing constraints. Specifically, the
variable cost component γ1 is assumed to be 12% whereas the quadratic cost component γ2 equals
0.04%. To investigate the impact of firm size, robustness checks will set µ equal to 4% thereby
implying a higher initial fundamental valuation and consequently lower relative costs of investment.
Also, external financing costs will be decreased and the magnitude of the expansion option will be
reduced.
9The risk-free rate is obtained using Datastream’s historical monthly Fed Funds data available since 1955 whereas
the volatility parameter is similar to Boyle and Guthrie (2003) and Mauer and Triantis (1994). The agency cost
parameter is taken from Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009).
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3.1 Cash Holdings and Investment
Ever since Fazzari et al. (1988) there has been an intensive discussion on the impact of financial
constraints on corporate investment decisions. In a recent paper, Denis and Sibilkov (2010) show
that financially constrained firms benefit from cash holdings as it enables them to pursue value
increasing investment projects. To compare the impact of optimal corporate saving on the invest-
ment policy of the firm, I therefore compare option trigger levels under complete external financing
to the case of optimal corporate saving policy. This is visualized in Figure [2].
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Figure 2: Relationship between the level of the cash account and option trigger levels.
Unsurprisingly, if the firm only has an (explicit) capacity expansion option but no freedom
regarding the choice of the corresponding financing strategy, the optimal trigger level does not
depend on the level of cash which is depicted by the green dashed line. However, if the firm has
the additional (implicit) option to choose a corresponding optimal financing strategy, the relation
between trigger level and cash holdings becomes nonlinear as shown by the blue solid line. Most
interestingly, it can be seen that if the firm has no cash savings, a firm with both an explicit
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expansion option and an implicit financing option would increase capacity later than if it chooses
to completely externally finance the project although they face precisely the same costs of external
finance at this point. This is due to the fact that under optimal corporate saving policy, there is
an additional value of not exercising the option immediately as the firm possesses a second option
to increase its capacity at a lower strike price. Only if the level of cash is sufficiently high, then it
would make sense for the firm to exercise its option prior to the case of complete external financing.
This result is important as it implies that a firm which saves cash to reduce future financing needs
might invest later than if it financed the project externally.
This simple example illustrates another difficulty in accurately distinguishing between con-
strained and unconstrained firms and subsequently make predictions regarding their investment
behavior. Using debt as a criterion to classify the degree of financial constraints, both cases pre-
sented in Figure [2] would be classified as unconstrained. Payout or saving policy alone is also
not useful in predicting investment decisions because its implications depend on the level of cash
holdings relative to total investment costs. In case the firm never saved and followed a full payout
policy - as illustrated by the green line - investment would never depend on the amount of cash the
firm has whereas under optimal corporate saving the effect is ambiguous. As long as the level of
cash is sufficiently low, the firm would wait even longer whereas at some point, investment would
strongly depend on the amount of internal funds.
Using Monte Carlo Simulation, one can then look at how much cash a firm would save until
it exercises the option. The left panel in Figure [3] displays the distribution of the firm’s cash
holdings prior to exercising the growth option. On average, the firm will have saved 8.65 units of
cash when it exercises the option and we can further see that in the majority of cases it will have
more than half of the necessary investment available as internal funds. Alternatively, one can look
at the actual exercise threshold under optimal corporate saving policy. It turns out that on average,
the firm will exercise the option if the cash flow equals 2.09. Focusing on the implied distribution
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of exercise thresholds shown in the right panel in Figure [3], it turns out that the distribution is
skewed to the left, meaning that there is a high chance that the firm will be able to internally
finance the investment, thereby demonstrating the importance of internal funds.
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Figure 3: Implied Distribution for Cash Holdings and Exercise Levels.
3.2 Optimal Saving Policy and the Value of Cash
As a next step, we can now investigate by how much the value of the initial growth option
increases if the firm follows an optimal corporate saving policy. The value maximizing policy leads
to an increase of S(x0, C0) to 6.6 %. In other words, if the firm starts with no cash at hand and
if the starting cash flow is equal to one, then the firm is able to increase the value of the capacity
expansion option by approximately 7 percent. Figure [4] shows the relative gain from saving across
different allocations of x, holding the initial cash level constant at zero. If x approximately equals
0.3, the relative gain from saving is highest at approximately 9%. However, if x approaches zero,
the relative gain from saving also drops off precipitously as the probability that the option will ever
get exercised is very low. On the other hand, increasing x above 0.3 also decreases the relative
gain from saving as the firm approaches the exercise threshold and therefore is left with less time
to build up the necessary cash reserves.
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Figure 4: The influence of x on the value of S(x,0).
Clearly, the results depend strongly on the magnitude of the agency costs, captured by the cost
parameter φ. For example, if one changes the value of φ to 0.025, then the relative gain from saving
evaluated at x0 and C0 increases to 8.55%. Even more so, if the firm does not suffer from agency
costs of free cash flow, then it would be able to increase the value of the capacity expansion option
by 11.45% if it retains funds within the firm. Given the different magnitude of the value added
by saving, it is not surprising that optimal corporate saving policy varies strongly across different
allocations of cash and cash flow, even when holding the agency cost parameter fixed. Recalling
from the previous section that the saving rate α is determined optimally by setting
α∗ =
VC − 1
φxVC
one can see in Figure [5] that for values of x close to zero the firm chooses to pay out most funds as
dividends. The reason is that agency costs of free cash flow dominate as the probability of exercising
the option is low. However, for slightly higher values of x it is optimal to retain some fraction of
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the cash flow in order to reduce future financing costs. Moreover, by simultaneously increasing C
we can see that the optimal retention ratio increases to as much as 100%. One the other hand, one
can also observe that although firms build up cash reserves in order to reduce potential investment
costs, it is optimal to retain less than 100% of the cash flow in most cases, thereby implying that
it is optimal for all-equity firms to simultaneously hold cash and pay dividends.
Figure 5: Optimal saving policy for different allocations of x and C.
In sum, optimal corporate saving policy is driven by the severance of agency costs of free cash flow,
current operating cash flow and the marginal value of cash. It is thus natural to next investigate
how the marginal value of cash differs across various allocations of cash and cash flow. Figure [6]
shows that for low levels of cash and cash flow the marginal value of internal funds equals one.
This can be explained by the fact that the probability of exercising the option is very low and thus
agency costs of free cash flow play a dominant role. Increasing the cash balance even leaves the
marginal value of internal funds unchanged for a wider range of values of x. In other words, if the
firm already has a lot of cash and current cash flow is low then it does not value an extra dollar at
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a premium to its notional amount. On the other hand, increasing x quickly leads to an increase in
VC above one. Thus, the more likely it is that the option gets exercised the more value the firm
places on internal funds. Depending on the allocation of x and C in the state space, the value
premium of cash converges to approximately 12%. This corresponds to the case when the option
would get exercised immediately such that the marginal value of cash is equal to the marginal costs
of external finance.
Figure 6: The marginal value of cash
Finally, I assess the relation of the value of internal funds with respect to volatility. The simplified
model of the previous section has shown that the effect of volatility on the hypothetical value of
internal funds is ambiguous which is illustrated in the left panel of Figure [7]. Performing a similar
analysis for the full model, it turns out that this relation is rather robust with respect to the
simplifying assumptions as one can see in the right panel of Figure [7]. The intuition is that cash
derives its value by possibly avoiding costs of external finance. While the value of the expansion
option is positively related to volatility, both for the case of external and internal financing, the
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increase is more pronounced for the case when the project is completely externally financed. In
other words, cash reduces the future strike price and therefore implies that the option is more in
the money. However, loosely speaking, this also enlarges the area of downside risk which is why
an increase in volatility is not necessarily value enhancing. Or put more simply, external financing
costs lose their relative importance for moderate to high levels of volatility, thereby implying the
negative relation between the value of internal funds and uncertainty.
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Figure 7: The impact of volatility on the value of internal funds for different payout policies
While the relation between the value of internal funds and volatility can be explained using its
definition as the difference between the two capacity expansion options, one might wonder whether
this also holds true for the marginal value of cash. I therefore also show how VC changes with
different levels of volatility. The relationship is again highly nonlinear and similar to the previous
figures. Figure [8] plots the marginal value of cash as a function of σ for the case when cash flow
is held constant at x0 and the level of cash equals 0.1, 1, 5 and 7.5 respectively. It is interesting
to notice that for moderate levels of volatility, i.e. 25 to 50 percent, the marginal value of cash is
decreasing across low to medium endowments of cash whereas the decrease only starts for levels of
40% and higher in case cash holdings equal 7.5 units.
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Figure 8: The marginal value cash and volatility for different levels of cash.
The analysis has shown that cash is valuable in the context of growth opportunities and that the
actual value depends on the specific combination between cash holdings and cash flow. In general, if
there is a realistic probability that the growth option will be exercised, the firm will optimally retain
some fraction of its cash flow to save for future investment outlays. At the same time, it is still
optimal to pay out the remaining fraction as dividends, thereby showing that simultaneous dividend
payments and cash holdings are the outcome of a value maximizing strategy. Most interestingly,
it turns out that saving has an ambiguous effect on the investment policy of the firm. If the firm
starts out with very low cash holdings, then it will actually wait longer to exercise its growth option
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than if it funded the project completely externally.
3.3 Simulated Data and Regression Analysis
Another possibility to assess the value of cash is to use regression analysis. This section therefore
relates observable model implied variables to overall firm value in order to obtain an estimate of
the shadow value of cash. Specifically, the model has shown that total firm value is given by
V (xt, Ct) = K0xt + Ct +G(xt, Ct) + E
[∫ ∞
t+1
e−r(s−t)K0xsdt
]
(17)
where K0xt denotes the level of current cash flow and the term E[
∫∞
t+1 e
−r(s−t)K0xsdt] represents
the discounted value of all future cash flows. Total firm value thus consists of the cash flow generated
today conditional on the asset capacity K0, the amount of cash the firm has retained, the value
of the growth option and the expected value of all future discounted cash flows. Because the true
value of the growth option can not be observed and can only be backed out by the identity given
in equation [17], I replace G(xt, Ct) with the closed form approximation provided in Section [2] to
arrive at the following testable equation
V (xt, Ct) = a+ β1K0xt + β2Ct + β3G(xt) + β4E
[∫ ∞
t+1
e−r(s−t)K0xsdt
]
+  (18)
The marginal value of cash is thus assessed by calculating the partial derivative of V (xt, Ct)
with respect to Ct, i.e.
∂Vt(xt, Ct)
∂Ct
= β2 (19)
Using Monte Carlo Simulation I therefore calculate firm value, cash holdings, fundamental firm
value and compute the approximated value of the growth option contingent on the realization of
the cash flow process. Furthermore, I set the length of the time step dt equal to 1/250, the time
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horizon equal to 20 years and set the number of replications equal to 1, 000.10 Table [1] shows
corresponding results when equation [17] is estimated for the entire set of firms which have not yet
exercised the growth option and when the time to save is limited to four or eight years. To reduce
the impact of the initial starting condition, I drop the first 100 realizations of each replication.
Table 1: The Simulated Value of Cash
(1) (2) (3)
All If Time < 4 years If Time < 8 Years
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Growth Options 0.943∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗
Fundamental Value at t+1 0.897∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗
Cash Holdings 1.012∗∗∗ 1.032∗∗∗ 1.036∗∗∗
Cash Flow 3.082∗ 2.726∗ 4.179∗∗
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
It can be seen that when the analysis is made for the entire simulated dataset, the average
value premium of cash equals 1.2 percent. Thus, even without conditioning on whether some firms
already have enough cash to internally finance the investment, cash is valued at a slight premium
to its notional amount. However, if the analysis is restricted to firms during the time of building
up the cash reserves, then the estimated value of cash more than doubles to 3.2 and 3.6 percent
respectively. In other words, by excluding firms who already saved a lot of cash but still have not
exercised their growth options, we can see that the marginal value of cash increases substantially.
To make sure that results are not driven by specific parameter values, the following section will
perform various robustness checks by varying the profitability of the firm and its financing and
investment costs.
3.4 Robustness Checks
I will now investigate the robustness of the results with respect to different parameter values.
Specifically, I will analyze three different scenarios. Under the first one, I reduce the importance
10Note that results are robust to setting the time step equal to monthly or quarterly data.
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of external financing costs by setting the value equal to Hennessy and Whited (2007) estimate
for large firms, i.e. γ1 = 5.3% and γ2 = 0.02%. Secondly, I decrease the impact of the capacity
expansion option and set it equal to 15%. Finally, I assume that the the firm is rather profitable
and set µ equal to 4%. This also allows me to investigate the effect of lower investment costs as
under the new assumption the initial fundamental value of the firm equals 50 which reduces the
relative importance of the investment costs to roughly 20%. Finally, results will be presented for
the interaction between cash holdings and investment policy, saving policy and the value of internal
funds and its relationship with respect to volatility.
Figure [9] displays the relation between the level of the cash account and option trigger levels in
the left panel and the relative gain from saving in the right panel for all analyzed cases. The top
graphs correspond to the case of low financing costs, the ones in the middle to a lower capacity
expansion option and the two figures on the bottom relate to higher profitability. Focusing first on
the relation between exercise policy and cash holdings, one can see that for all cases a saving firm
would exercise the growth option later than if it finances the growth option completely externally.
Thus, saving has its own time value which implies an optimal delay in the firm’s investment policy.
Most interestingly, in the case of high profitability the firm would almost always wait longer to
exercise the growth option and only if it has retained more than 90% of the investment costs, it
would exercise the option earlier than under the case of complete external financing. The graphs
in the right panel of Figure [9] show that the relative gain from saving is reduced in case of lower
financing costs or profitability. This is because holding all other parameter values constant, the
relative effect of external financing costs is reduced if profitability is higher or financing costs are
low. However, one can also see that if the magnitude of the capacity expansion option is reduced
to 15%, the maximum relative gain from saving is still equal to roughly 9%, as predicted in Section
[2].
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Figure 9: The impact of volatility on the value of internal funds for different payout policies
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Finally, one can analyze the effect on volatility on the value of cash. The left panel in Figure
[10] shows the relation between the value of internal funds R(x,C) and volatility, as defined in the
real-options model. It can be seen that for low financing costs and high profitability, the relation
is similar to the baseline case. When the magnitude of the capacity expansion option is reduced,
volatility only has a negative impact on the value of internal funds if it is already higher than
approximately 30 or 40 percent. Thus it seems that, technically speaking, if the potential payoff
from exercising is less convex then increasing volatility has a more positive impact in case the option
is more in the money, i.e. in case the firm engages in precautionary saving.
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4 Empirical Analysis
The model presented in the previous section has shown that in the context of growth opportunities
cash can be valued at a premium to its notional amount if external financing costs and agency costs
of free cash flow are traded-off optimally. The objective of this section is to combine the model
implied valuation equation with existing empirical literature in order to assess whether all-equity
firms add or destroy value by holding that much cash.
It turns out that the formulation presented in equation [17] is similar to existing empirical
literature on the value of cash which has been influenced by Fama and French (1998) who analyze
the impact of taxes and financing decisions on firm value. They estimate cross-sectional regressions
to analyze how firm value is related to leverage, dividends and other firm characteristics. The
regression specification in Fama and French (1998) captures the intuition of this model that firm
value consists of a fundamental part relating to the book value of assets and cash flow plus it also
controls for growth opportunities and tax effects. Specifically, their setup is given by
Vt −At
At
= a+ β1
Et
At
+ β2
RDt
At
+ β3
It
At
+ β4
Dt
At
+ β5
dAt
At
+ β6
dAt+1
At
+ β7
dYt
At
+ β8
dYt+1
At
+ β9
dVt+1
At
+ t
(20)
where Vt is total market value of a firm, At is book value of assets, Vt−At is interpreted as the
spread of value over cost, Et stands for earnings, RDt is R&D expenditures, It is interest expenses,
Dt is total dividends paid, dAt is the lagged change of total assets, i.e. dAt = At−At−1 and dAt+1
equals the corresponding lead change in At, i.e. dAt+1 = At+1 − At. The vector Yt is introduced
to facilitate notation and it consists of earnings, research and development expenditures, interest
payments and dividends with dYt being the lagged change in variable Yt whereas dYt+1 equals the
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lead change in in variable Yt.
11 To avoid that results are dominated by the largest firms in the
sample, all variables are scaled by the book value of assets.12
The Fama and French (1998) approach is similar to the general valuation equation implied from
the real-options model as it relates firm value to the value of cash-flow generating assets in place,
measured by At and Et and it uses leads of the different variables to account for market expecta-
tions and future cash flows. Research and development expenses are included because accounting
requirements imply that total assets might be understated for firms with growth opportunities,
i.e. for firms with high R&D expenses. Combining the Fama and French (1998) setup with the
setup used for the regressions based on simulated data, i.e. equation [18] and following Pinkowitz
et al. (2006) who recognize that the book value of assets can be split up into a cash and non-cash
component, I propose the following regression specification.
Vt −NAt
At
= a+ β1
Ct
At
+ β2
Et
At
+ β3
RDt
At
+ β4
Dt
At
+ β5
dCt
At
+ β6
dCt+1
At
+ β7
dNAt
At
+ β8
dNAt+1
At
+ β11
dYt
At
+ β10
dYt+1
At
+ t
(21)
Specifically, I regress the spread between the market value of the firm and its non-cash assets on
the current level of the firm’s cash account and its earnings which relate to the current income stream
K0xt generated under asset capacity K0 in the real-options model. Research and development
expenses are included to proxy for growth opportunities G(xt, Ct) and leads of the different variables
are used to account for market expectations and future cash flows. The coefficient on dividend
payments can be interpreted as a proxy for the presence of agency costs of free cash flow or tax
11Specifically, Yt is defined as Yt ≡ [Et, RDt, It, Dt]
12Besides, this also helps to mitigate heteroskedasticity in the error terms.
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distortions.13 To avoid that large firms dominate the sample and to mitigate heteroskedasticity in
the error terms, I follow Fama and French (1998) and scale all variables by total assets.
It is important to notice that this specification is an extension to Pinkowitz et al. (2006) as it
allows for the separate inclusion of the level of cash while still accounting for the level of non-cash
assets NAt in the estimation setup. The inclusion is implied by the real-options model which has
shown that non-cash assets, as proxied for by the existing level of production capacity, are an
important source of firm value. Besides, the approach suggested in this paper includes both the
level and changes of cash simultaneously, much like Fama and French (1998) considered both the
level and changes of assets. As I will argue in this paper, the consideration of both the level of cash
and non-cash assets has important consequences when estimating the marginal value of cash.
For what follows, I first describe the data underlying the econometric analyses and give brief
summary statistics. Next, I estimate the value of cash for the entire sample of all-equity firms to
assess whether on average all-equity firms add or destroy value by holding cash. Then, I look at the
value of cash in the context of growth opportunities before concluding the section with a variety of
robustness checks.
4.1 Data and Summary Statistics
The study uses accounting data from COMPUSTAT and includes firm year observations from 1950
to 2006. To ensure comparability of the results to Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) industrial
annual files are used. As usual, financial firms and utilities are deleted from the sample.14 All
variables are calculated similarly to Fama and French (1998) and Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004).
Finally, fiscal year-end values are used.
13Note that this analysis concerns all-equity firms which is why interest payments do not enter the estimation
equation.
14Specifically, a firm is omitted if its primary SIC is between 4900 and 4999 or between 6000 and 6999.
35
Total firm value is given by calculating the sum of market value of equity at fiscal year-end
and book value of debt, i.e. (V = D54 ×D199 + D34 + D9).15 Earnings correspond to earnings
before extraordinary items, interest, deferred tax credits and investment tax credits, i.e. (E =
D18 + D15 + D50 + D51). Cash is equivalent to cash plus marketable securities (C = D1).
Dividends are measured as common dividends paid, i.e. D = D21. Net assets equal the difference
between total assets and cash, i.e. NA = (D6 −D1). Research and development expenses finally
correspond to data item number D46 and the entry is set to zero if missing. All-equity financed
firms are defined following Strebulaev and Yang (2006) by requiring that the the sum of both short-
term debt (D34) and long-term debt (D9) equals zero. As the regression specification includes both
leads and lags, this implies that a firm is only included in the sample if it is classified as an all-equity
firm for three consecutive years. Finally, in order to reduce the influence of outliers trim the sample
by dropping 1 percent of the observations in each tail of the explanatory variables.16
Table [6] displays summary statistics for for selected variables. It can be seen that the average
firm with zero debt has a value-to-asset ratio of approximately 1.92. This is substantially more
than the average value-to-asset ratio for the entire sample including levered firms, which is around
1.28. Besides, all-equity firms have cash holdings equal to 34 percent of their assets and they pay
out approximately 2 percent of total assets as dividends. This compares to 11.5 percent relative
cash holdings and 1 percent dividends when using the entire sample of levered and unlevered firms.
Interestingly, all-equity firms are slightly less profitable with a return on assets of 3.4 percent
compared to 4.2 percent return on assets for the entire sample. However, all-equity firms invest
approximately 5 percent of their assets into research and development whereas the corresponding
entry for the entire sample equals only 2.3 percent. The table for the entire sample can be found
in the Appendix.
15The numbers correspond to Compustat data item numbers.
16Fama and French (1998) explain that scaling by assets leads to potentially huge outliers if the asset value is close
to zero. Given that all-equity firms are on average smaller than their levered counterparts, I therefore trim 1% of the
observations in each tail of the explanatory variable. Because trimming is done with respect to the full sample this
reduces the total sample by less than 2%.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for All-Equity Firms.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Value-to-Assets Ratio 1.917 1.684 0.272 14.796
Relative Cash Holdings 0.337 0.201 0 0.862
Relative Noncash Assets 0.663 0.201 0.138 1
Relative Earnings 0.034 0.163 -1.891 0.263
Relative Research and Development Expenses 0.047 0.077 0 0.501
Relative Dividends 0.018 0.025 0 0.096
N 6429
Summing up, all-equity firms are valued at higher multiples and invest more heavily into research
and development than the average firm of the entire sample which also includes levered firms.
Confirming Strebulaev and Yang (2006), relative cash holdings are huge and make up roughly one
third of total assets. Using the Fama and French 12 Industry Classification scheme, one can further
see that each single industry holds roughly at least as much cash as the average cash holdings
reported in Bates et al. (2009) for both levered and unlevered firms. It is therefore only natural to
ask whether all-equity firms destroy or add value by holding that much cash.
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Figure 11: Average Cash Holdings of Different Industries as classified according to the Fama and French 12
Industry Classification Scheme.
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4.2 Results
This section presents results for the value of cash using equation [21] and compares it to those
obtained when following the Pinkowitz et al. (2006) approach. Regressions will be estimated ac-
counting for firm fixed effects and by including time dummies. Additionally, standard errors are
estimated according to Discroll and Kraay (1998) to account for possible cross-sectional interdepen-
dence among the error terms.17 Due to the introduction of lead and lag variables in the regression
setup, the value of cash is given by
∂
(
Vt−NAt
At
)
∂
(
Ct
At
) = βˆ1 + βˆ5 − βˆ6 (22)
When interpreting results, I will further impose the null hypothesis that the true value is equal
to one, i.e. that cash is valued at par without frictions. The analysis proceeds as follows. First, I
estimate the value of cash for the entire sample of all equity firms. Then I will proxy for growth
opportunities before finally displaying results regarding the sensitivity of cash with respect to
volatility.
Table [3] displays results for the value of cash and compares it to the two approaches proposed
by Pinkowitz et al. (2006). Again, the extension considers the fact that the setup proposed in
this paper also includes the level of non-cash assets and that the level and changes of cash are
included simultaneously whereas Pinkowitz et al. (2006) consider them separately. Hence, the
labels ”level regression” and ”changes regression” in their paper.18 It can be seen that when the
value of cash is estimated according to the framework proposed in this paper, cash is valued at par
in the cross-section. Specifically, by plugging the coefficients of Ct, dCt and dCt+1 into equation
[22] the estimated value is equal to 1.003 which is also statistically insignificantly different from 1.
In other words, on average all-equity firms do not destroy value by holding that much cash.
17As a robustness check, results will also be presented when estimation is done according to the Fama-MacBeth
approach
18More details on the approach of Pinkowitz et al. (2006) are provided in the Appendix.
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Table 3: The Value of Cash
(1) (2) (3)
Kisser (2010) PSW (2006) - Level PSW (2006) - Changes
Coefficient T-Statistics Coefficient T-Statistics Coefficient T-Statistics
Ct 1.836∗∗∗ 6.95 0.495∗ 2.37
Et 0.597 1.13 1.843∗∗∗ 3.89 0.635 1.25
RDt 3.760∗∗ 3.29 4.404∗∗∗ 3.66 3.752∗∗ 3.28
Dt 4.663 1.46 2.632 0.79 4.791 1.51
dCt 1.016∗∗∗ 8.27 1.200∗∗∗ 10.49
dCt+1 1.849∗∗∗ 12.11 1.695∗∗∗ 13.92
dNAt 1.396∗∗∗ 13.36 1.043∗∗∗ 9.56 1.267∗∗∗ 11.57
dNAt+1 1.456∗∗∗ 10.65 1.048∗∗∗ 7.87 1.566∗∗∗ 10.09
dEt 0.020 0.13 0.227 1.40 -0.015 -0.10
dEt+1 0.649∗ 2.22 1.562∗∗∗ 5.57 0.620∗ 2.10
dRDt -0.462 -0.73 -0.236 -0.36 -0.339 -0.50
dRDt+1 3.224∗∗ 3.22 4.542∗∗∗ 4.15 3.281∗∗∗ 3.31
dDt 9.945∗ 2.48 9.619∗ 2.41 10.459∗∗ 2.59
dDt+1 8.674∗∗ 2.62 10.124∗∗ 3.15 9.289∗∗ 2.84
dVt+1 -0.277∗∗∗ -8.95 -0.235∗∗∗ -8.36 -0.276∗∗∗ -9.05
Observations 6429 6429 6429
R2 0.302 0.243 0.285
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
However, we can also see that the interpretation would be different if estimated according to
Pinkowitz et al. (2006). Specifically, if the level regression was employed one would conclude that
firms actually destroy value as the coefficient of the cash variable equals 0.495 whereas under the
changes regression the result depends on whether the coefficient of dCt or the difference between
dCt and dCt+1 is the basis of the interpretation.
While this result is interesting per se, the ultimate interest lies in analyzing the value of cash
in the context of growth options and with respect to volatility. Traditionally, the literature on
financing and investment decisions uses the ratio between the market value of a firm’s physical
assets and its replacement costs as a proxy for the value of growth opportunities. Examples include
Hayashi (1982), Fazzari et al. (1988), Erickson and Whited (2000) and Hennessy (2004). However,
given that the market value enters the numerator of the dependent variable, one has to search
for another proxy for the presence of growth opportunities. Potential candidates employed in the
finance and accounting literature include research and development (R&D) expenses and capital
expenditures (CAPEX). See for example Stowe and Xing (2006), Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004),
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Goyal et al. (2002), Lang et al. (1996), Gaver and Gaver (1993) , Skinner (1993) and Smith and
Watts (1992) among others. Given the relatively small sample size for all-equity firms and the fact
that for a substantial fraction R&D Expenses equal zero, I use CAPEX for the subsequent analysis.
Specifically, Goyal et al. (2002) propose to use the ratio between CAPEX and the book value of
its assets to control for the presence of growth opportunities. I therefore extend equation [21] by
including an interaction term between relative cash holdings and capital expenditures, i.e.
Vt −NAt
At
= a+ β1
Ct
At
+ β2
Ct
At
CAPEXt
At
+ β3
Et
At
+ β4
RDt
At
+ β5
Dt
At
+ β6
dCt
At
+ β7
dCt+1
At
+ β8
dNAt
At
+ β9
dNAt+1
At
+ β10
dYt
At
+ β11
dYt+1
At
+ t
(23)
Table [4] displays results when including the interaction between cash holdings and capital ex-
penditures. It can be seen that the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically
different from zero. In other words, if firms invest into capital expenditures and have positive cash
holdings then this has a positive impact on firm value. Clearly, in a frictionless world the coefficient
should be equal to zero. Moreover, this effect is not limited to the estimation approach suggested
in this paper but also manifests itself in the level regression approach suggested by Pinkowitz et al.
(2006). While the effect is also positive in the changes regression, it is statistically insignificant.
We have thus seen that cash has additional value if one controls for the presence of growth
opportunities. As a last step, I analyze whether this value is negatively related to volatility as
it was implied by the real-options model introduced in the Section [2]. I follow Han and Qiu
(2007) and Minton and Schrand (1999) who calculate historic cash flow volatility by computing the
coefficient of variation of operating cash flow. This approach has been also suggested by Albrecht
and Richardson (1990) and Michelson et al. (1995).19 More specifically, I calculate operating cash
19The intuition for using the coefficient of variation is to have a unitless measure of variation.
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Table 4: The Value of Cash in the Context of Growth Options
(1) (2) (3)
Kisser (2010) PSW (2006) - Level PSW (2006) - Changes
Coefficient T-Statistics Coefficient T-Statistics Coefficient T-Statistics
Ct 1.646∗∗∗ 5.95 0.321 1.37
Ct X Capext 4.650∗∗∗ 4.05 3.610∗∗ 2.86
Et 0.434 0.81 1.778∗∗∗ 3.71 0.531 1.04
RDt 3.603∗∗ 3.03 4.328∗∗∗ 3.39 3.596∗∗ 3.03
Dt 4.336 1.26 2.296 0.65 4.360 1.24
dCt 1.094∗∗∗ 8.12 1.075∗∗∗ 6.25
dCt+1 1.886∗∗∗ 12.23 1.736∗∗∗ 13.42
dNAt 1.303∗∗∗ 10.78 0.942∗∗∗ 7.46 1.272∗∗∗ 10.49
dNAt+1 1.456∗∗∗ 8.75 1.024∗∗∗ 6.47 1.610∗∗∗ 9.05
dEt 0.247 1.80 0.440∗∗ 3.19 0.170 1.29
dEt+1 0.715∗ 2.21 1.671∗∗∗ 5.35 0.697∗ 2.18
dRDt -0.601 -1.00 -0.381 -0.59 -0.323 -0.53
dRDt+1 3.232∗∗ 2.98 4.623∗∗∗ 3.97 3.246∗∗ 3.02
dDt 9.833∗ 2.18 9.428∗ 2.08 10.451∗ 2.28
dDt+1 8.188∗ 2.45 9.823∗∗ 3.03 8.813∗∗ 2.64
dVt+1 -0.285∗∗∗ -9.02 -0.243∗∗∗ -8.20 -0.283∗∗∗ -8.82
dCt X Capext 2.494 1.43
Observations 6030 6030 6030
R2 0.317 0.257 0.300
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
flow by using quarterly Compustat data and computing it as sales (D2) less cost of goods sold (D30)
minus selling, general and administrative expenses (D1) less the change in net working capital which
in turn is given by the sum of non-missing amounts for accounts receivable (D37), inventory (D38)
and other current assets (D39) less the sum of non-missing amounts for accounts payable (D46),
income taxes payable (D47) and other current liabilities (D48). Initial volatility is calculated using
quarterly observations from 1962 until 1989. A company is excluded from the sample if it has less
than 15 quarterly observations available. Each year the estimation window is extended by one year
while the initial observation period is held fixed at 1962. To check whether the negative relation
between the value of cash and volatility holds, I estimate the following regression.
Vt −NAt
At
= α+ β1
Ct
At
+ β2
Ct
At
CAPEXt
At
+ β3
Ct
At
CAPEXt
At
σt + β4
Ct
At
CAPEXt
At
σ2t
+ ...+ β8
dCt
At
+ β9
dCt+1
At
+ ...+ t (24)
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where the coefficients β3 and β4 capture the effect of volatility and variance on the value of cash
in the context of growth opportunities.
Table 5: The Value of Cash, Growth Options and Volatility
(1) (2) (3)
Kisser (2010) PSW (2006) - Level PSW (2006) - Changes
Coefficient T-Statistics Coefficient T-Statistics Coefficient T-Statistics
Ct 3.781*** 5.81 2.504*** 4.66
Ct X Capext 5.137 0.84 1.463 0.24
Ct X Capext X σ -1.318 -1.37 -1.476 -1.66
Ct X Capext X σ2 0.017 1.53 0.019+ 1.81
Et -0.164 -0.06 4.177 1.67 3.239 1.33
RDt 3.261 0.68 7.540 1.61 9.177+ 1.92
Dt 17.331 1.60 16.239 1.32 29.115* 2.42
dCt 2.371* 2.24 1.905 1.32
dCt+1 2.961*** 4.18
dNAt 4.023*** 6.61 2.658*** 4.66 3.296*** 5.13
dNAt+1 0.939 1.58 -0.854 -1.21 -0.178 -0.25
dEt 0.811 1.02 1.419 1.63 0.842 0.92
dEt+1 1.622+ 1.82 3.586*** 4.98 3.541*** 5.01
dRDt -1.963 -0.57 -2.620 -0.85 -4.452 -1.43
dRDt+1 -8.734*** -3.94 -5.914* -2.42 -6.120* -2.08
dDt -9.330 -0.81 -5.102 -0.49 -2.778 -0.25
dDt+1 29.060 1.12 35.674+ 1.81 26.939 1.55
dVt+1 -0.241+ -2.00 -0.121 -0.89 -0.156 -1.26
dCt X Capext 8.431 0.85
dCt X Capext X σ 1.976 0.55
dCt X Capext X σ2 -0.015 -0.29
Observations 312 312 312
R2 0.429 0.334 0.324
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Table [5] shows that while cash flow volatility has a negative impact on the value of cash, the
coefficient is not statistically different from zero. Interestingly, one can see that while the coefficients
on volatility and variance are insignificant, they still increase the R squared substantially from 32
to 43 percent. However, it should be noted that the sample size is very small due to the requirement
that firms are all-equity financed for the entire period over which cash flow volatility is calculated.
4.3 Robustness Checks
The Appendix presents results with respect to two different robustness checks. First, I present
results in case the regressions are estimated according to the Fama MacBeth approach. Second, I
estimate how the value of cash changes if estimated over a more recent time period.
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The results presented in this paper are based on estimating a fixed effects model while standard
errors are calculated according to Discroll and Kraay (1998) which are robust to any form of cross-
sectional dependance of the error terms. As a robustness check, I also present results according
to the Fama MacBeth approach. Following Petersen (2009) who also emphasizes the need to
employ Fama MacBeth approach for a correctly specified model, I use the demeaned value of the
individual variables as independent and dependent variables in the regression setup. Figure [7]
displays corresponding results in the Appendix. Again, it turns out that by controlling for net
assets, the value of cash for all-equity firms is not statistically different from one. On the other
hand, the interaction term between is statistically indifferent from zero in all three regressions.
Further unreported results show that that volatility does not impact the value of cash under the
Fama MacBeth approach.
Finally, I briefly check whether results are robust to the specified time period and therefore
estimate the value of cash for all-equity firms since 1990. The value of cash is approximately equal
to one whereas the interaction term between cash and capital expenditures is significantly positive.
Full results are shown in Table [8] in the Appendix.
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5 Conclusion
As of 2006, roughly 20% of all large U.S. public corporations were all-equity financed. On top of
that, average cash holdings were nearly twice as high as in the case of both levered and unlevered
firms. This paper thus addresses the question whether all-equity financed firms destroy or add
value by hoarding cash.
I therefore propose a simple real-options model which derives the value of internal funds within
a capacity expansion problem. Departing from traditional real option models, the paper focuses
on the question of how the costs of the investment are actually financed and thereby derives the
optimal trade-off between costs of external finance and agency costs of free cash flow. Doing so,
it is shown that cash is valued at a premium to its notional amount and that there is a negative
relation between the value of cash and volatility. This is because cash derives its value by reducing
future financing costs and thereby essentially reduces the exercise price of the capacity expansion
option. As it turns out, this option loses importance in case of higher volatility. The paper also
shows that if a firm engages in precautionary saving it might wait longer to exercise its growth
option than if it funded the project completely externally. Again, because saving is nothing else
than an additional option to exercise the same project at a lower price, it has its own value of
waiting which influences the investment decision. Also, it turns out that simultaneously holding
cash and paying dividends can be the result of a value maximizing strategy.
The empirical section combines the model implied estimation equation with an empirical ap-
proach introduced by Pinkowitz et al. (2006). By doing so, I propose a simple, yet important
extension to the existing literature and show that on average all-equity firms do not destroy value
by holding that much cash. Moreover, cash is rather valued at a premium if the presence of growth
opportunities is controlled for.
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A Theory Part
A.1 Proof of Proposition [1]
[Proof] Using the fact that µ = r − δ we can write that dx = (r − δ)xdt+ σxdWQ. Let’s suppose
we construct a risk-free portfolio by holding θ1 units of the firm and shorting θ2 units of the
traded asset. The long position of the portfolio entitles us to an instantaneous dividend payment
θ1(1−α)x. The value of the portfolio P is given by (θ1V −θ2X) and it follows that the total return
from holding the portfolio over a short time interval dt equals
dP = θ1 ((1− α)xdt+ dV )− θ2dX (25)
Applying Ito’s Lemma leaves us with
dP = θ1
(
(1− α)xdt+ Vxdx+ VCdC + 1
2
σ2x2Vxxdt
)
− θ2dX (26)
For θ1 = 1 , it immediately follows that θ2 equals
(
Vxx
X
)
which then implies that dP = rPdt.
Combining above and using the fact that P = (V − xVxX X) we obtain that
rV = (1− α)x+ (r − δ)xVx + (αx− φ
2
(αx)2 + rC)VC + 1/2σ
2x2Vxx (27)
The only step missing is to treat α as a stochastic optimal control by imposing that
rV = max
α
{
(1− α)x+ (r − δ)xVx + (αx− φ
2
(αx)2 + rC)VC + 1/2σ
2x2Vxx
}
(28)
Taking the FOC with respect to α implies that
α∗ =
VC − 1
φxVC
(29)
with the additional requirement that α∗ ∈ [0, 1].
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A.2 Proof of Proposition [2]
[Proof] By assumption α is set to 0 such that the PDE in equation [4] simplifies to
rV B = x+ (r − δ)xV Bx + rCV BC + 1/2σ2x2V Bxx (30)
which has to be solved with respect to
V B(0, Ct) = Ct
V B(x∗, Cτ ) = K1x
∗
δ + Cτ − IC − e(IC)
V Bx (x
∗, Cτ ) = K1δ
(31)
Assuming that V B(x,C) = νC +Bxβ + γx and solving the PDE with respect to the boundary
conditions implies that
x∗2 =
β1
(β1 − 1) (K1 −K0)δ(IC + e(IC)) (32)
where β1 is the positive root of the fundamental quadratic
1
2
β(β − 1) + µβ − r = 0 (33)
It follows that V B(x,C) = K0xδ +Bx
β1 +C where B =
(
(K1−K0)x∗2
δ − IC − e(IC)
)(
1
x∗2
)β1
and
τ equals the exercise time of the option which is formally defined as {τ := inf {u > 0 : xu = x∗2}}.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition [3]
[Proof] By assumption we have that C ≥ IC and α = 0. It suffices to solve the PDE given in [8]
with respect to
V ′(0, Ct) = Ct
V ′(x∗, Cτ ) = K1x
∗
δ + Cτ − IC
V ′x(x∗, Cτ ) =
K1
δ
(34)
Assuming that V ′(x,C) = νC + Axβ + γx and solving the PDE with respect to the boundary
conditions implies that
x∗ =
β1
(β1 − 1) (K1 −K0)δIC (35)
where β1 is the positive root of the fundamental quadratic
1
2
β(β − 1) + µβ − r = 0 (36)
It follows that V ′(x,C) = K0xδ + Ax
β1 + C where A =
(
(K1−K0)x∗
δ − IC
) (
1
x∗
)β1 and τ equals
the exercise time of the option which is formally defined as {τ := inf {u > 0 : xu = x∗}}.
On the other hand, if the firm decides to pay out the initial cash balance and all future earnings
as dividends, then the dynamics of the cash account are given by the following equation
dC = (rC − C)dt (37)
Using similar arguments as when deriving the PDE in equation [4] we obtain that
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rV ′′ = x+ C + (r − δ)xV ′′x + (rC − C)V ′′C + 1/2σ2x2V ′′xx (38)
Because of the full payout assumption it follows that total costs of exercising the option are
given by IC+ e(IC). Assuming that the solution is given by V ′′(x,C) = νC+Bxβ +γx it directly
follows that V ′′(x,C) = V B(x,C) such that the solution is given by
Rh(x,C) = xβ1 (A−B) (39)
A.4 Proof of Proposition [4]
[Proof] Notice that by definition we have that Sh(x) = Ax
β1
Bxβ1
−1. Noting that x∗ = β1(β1−1)(K1−K0)ICδ,
defining ∆K = K1 −K0 and taking the derivative of the whole expression with respect to ∆K we
obtain the desired result.
A.5 Proof of Proposition [5]
[Proof] Concerning the partial derivative of any growth option with respect to volatility, it is
sufficient to observe that
∂Axβ1
∂σ
= Axβ1 log
( x
x∗
)∂β1
∂σ
(40)
as ∂Ax
β1
∂x∗
∂x∗
∂β1
equals zero. Given that the positive solution to the fundamental quadratic is
characterized by the same parameters for both the constrained and unconstrained firm, we only
need to know that ∂β1∂σ < 0. Further details can be found in Dixit & Pindyck Dixit and Pindyck
(1991).
Applying above to ∂R
h(x)
∂σ we get that
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∂Rh(x)
∂σ
=
∂β1
∂σ
{
Axβ1 log
( x
x∗
)
−Bxβ1 log
(
x
x∗2
)}
(41)
Using the fact that x∗2 = x∗(1 + γ) where γ = (γ1 + γ2IC) and that Bxβ1 = Axβ1(1 + γ)1−β1 ,
we can rewrite the equation as
∂Rh(x)
∂σ
=
∂β1
∂σ
{
Axβ1 log
( x
x∗
)
−Axβ1(1 + γ)1−β1 log
(
x
x∗(1 + γ)
)}
(42)
which again can be rewritten as
∂Rh(x)
∂σ
= Axβ1
∂β1
∂σ
{
log
( x
x∗
)
− (1 + γ)1−β1 log
(
x
x∗(1 + γ)
)}
(43)
Due to the fact that x < x∗ < x∗(1 + γ) we know that log
(
x
x∗
)
> log
(
x
x∗(1+γ)
)
. The question
whether the expression in the bracket is positive or negative will depend on (1 + γ)1−β1 which will
lie between 0 and 1 for different values of γ and β1.
B Numerical Solution
Equation [11] is defined for 2 ≤ j ≤M and 2 ≤ i ≤ N . One alternative would be to solve the PDE
by using the boundary conditions defined in [6]. However, this is computationally demanding as
one has to consider the entire grid. To overcome this drawback, I will divide the state space of C
into two different regimes. We know that if the firm has sufficient cash available, i.e. C ≥ IC, it
will not retain its earnings as it only incurs costs of holding cash within the firm. Therefore, for
C ≥ IC we will have that α = 0. It is also known that because C ≥ IC the firm will not need to
access costly external capital markets and as a consequence it will be able to finance the investment
at its true costs IC. However, when α = 0 and C ≥ IC the value of an option to invest can be
derived analytically as there is no contradiction between the boundary conditions anymore.
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Proposition 6 For C ≥ IC and α = 0, total firm value, denoted by V ′(x,C) has a closed firm
solution which is given by
V ′(x,C) =
K0x
δ
+Axβ1 + C (44)
where A =
(
∆Kx∗
δ − IC
) (
1
x∗
)β1 with the corresponding optimal trigger level x∗.
Proof: See Appendix.
Thus, as long as x < x∗ we know that for C ≥ IC value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
are given by
V (x∗, Cτ ) = V ′(x∗, Cτ )
Vx(x
∗, Cτ ) = V ′x(x∗, Cτ )
(45)
This has the advantage that the grid for C has an upper limit equal to the value of IC which
drastically decreases computational requirements.
While for the case when C ≥ IC, optimal trigger level was independent of the two state variables,
exercise policy when allowing the firm to retain cash depends on the level of C which in turn is
affected by the retention rate α and operating profit x. The optimal exercise point will depend on
the level of cash the firm has available which in turn will be affected by the firms operating profit
and its retention rate.
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C Empirical Part
C.1 The Pinkowitz et al. (2006) Approach
Pinkowitz et al. (2006) propose the following specification to test for the value of cash
Vt
At
= α+ β1
dCt
At
+ β2
dCt+1
At
+ β3
dNAt
At
+ β4
dNAt+1
At
+ β5
Yt
At
+ β6
dYt
At
+ β7
dYt+1
At
+ β8
dVt+1
At
+ t (46)
where for simplicity I introduce the vector Yt to summarize earnings, interest payments, divi-
dends and research and development expenses, i.e.
Yt ≡ [Et, RDt, It, Dt] (47)
with dYt and dYt+1 corresponding to the lagged and lead changes in the underlying variables.
Because the levels of cash Ct and non-cash assets NAt do not explicitly appear in the equation,
it must be implicitly assumed that they are included in the constant.20 Pinkowitz et al. (2006)
argue that the coefficient β1 thus captures the market value of cash for a one dollar increase in
cash-holdings compared to the previous period.
Alternatively, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) propose a level regression which includes the level of cash
Ct instead of the lagged and lead changes dCt and dCt+1.
Vt
At
= α+ β1
Ct
At
+ β2
dNAt
At
+ β3
dNAt+1
At
+ β4
Yt
At
+ β5
dYt
At
+ β6
dYt+1
At
+ β7
dVt+1
At
+ t (48)
20Note that NAt+Ct
At
= 1.
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Given that non-cash assets do not appear in the equation, the coefficient on Ct does not necessarily
capture the value of cash. This might be the reason why it was only suggested as an alternative to
the changes regression.
C.2 Results
Table 6: Summary Statistics for Levered and Unlvered Firms. All variables are scaled by the volume of total
assets.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Value-to-Assets Ratio 1.282 1.073 0.268 15.04
Relative Cash Holdings 0.115 0.137 0 0.862
Relative Noncash Assets 0.885 0.137 0.138 1
Relative Earnings 0.042 0.133 -2.422 0.265
Relative Research and Development Expenses 0.023 0.051 0 0.565
Relative Dividends 0.01 0.015 0 0.096
N 124905
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